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Introduction
Competitiveness is "… a largely meaningless concept…", Paul Krugman tells us in an often quoted 1994 article (Krugman, 1994:41) , claiming that "... it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other " (1994:30) and stating that "… the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong, but dangerous…" (Ibid.).
Unfortunately, his conclusions are false and misleading. He is right in asserting that "countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do" (1994:34) and he is also right in stating that, under certain conditions, trade is a positive-sum game. However, he is absolutely wrong in his overall assessment because he ignores a phenomenon that has become increasingly important over the last decades, namely the increased international mobility of factors of production. Capital, technology and highly skilled labour have become more mobile internationally, and their availability influences the productivity of the immobile domestic factors of production, including traditional labour and land.
Countries compete for these mobile factors of production. If they succeed in attracting them, they increase their factor endowment and raise the productivity of their immobile domestic factors. If, however, they lose them, the productivity of their domestic immobile factors is reduced. Moreover, the increased factor mobility reduces governments' room to manoeuvre. Thus, there is competition between countries, and the paradigm of competition between locations or of "Standortwettbewerb", as it is called in German with a long tradition, is indeed a * HORST SIEBERT, President-Emeritus of the Kiel Institute for World Economics, Jelle Zijlstra Research powerful concept in the theory of the international division of labour 1 . It refers to the competitiveness of a location in its capacity to attract within its borders mobile factors of production or to hold on to them.
This paper looks at the concept of locational competition and its implications. It describes the channels through will countries compete for the mobile factors of production (section 2) and portrays the structure of a model of locational competition (section 3). Then the benefits and costs, especially for the capitalexporting country, are studied (section 4) and the relevance for governments and trade unions is shown (section 5). The paper addresses the issues whether locational competition leads to a race to the bottom or whether it is a discovery device (section 6), whether international rules represent a cartel of governments or whether they are needed to reduce transaction costs (section 7) and whether a single world equilibrium or many national equilibriums will exist (section 8).
The final section draws the conclusions.
Channels of Locational Competition
Competition between locations -between regions of an economy, between countries or even between regions of the world like the European Union and the United States -occurs through a number of channels of interaction, most importantly through the movement of capital, technology and people.
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Locational competition is about explicitly competing for endowments with mobile factors. This approach is in contrast to traditional trade theory where the interaction between countries through the exchange of goods and services is at 1 See Siebert (2000) . For American voices compare Findlay (1995) and on the role of increased mobility for monetary policy, fiscal policy and regulation see Cooper (1974) . On the relationship between trade theory and local public economics see Wilson (1987) . On capital mobility in trade models see Feenstra (2004) , Chapter 11. See also work on interjurisdictional competition (Oates and Schwab 1988) . 2 Another field of locational competition is between metropolitan areas, for instance in per capita income, square feet of housing, office space and industrial buildings.
centre stage and where the main story is about exploiting international differences in given factor endowments, technology and preferences.
Capital is completely mobile ex ante if savings are not yet embodied in machinery and buildings. Foreign direct investment (FDI) can theoretically locate anywhere in the world. Strictly speaking, physical capital which is already in place is not mobile. But it can be turned into mobile funds ex post, when depreciation allowances are earned in the market. These funds do not have to be reinvested in the same location, but can be reallocated to other places.
Foreign direct investment in the world economy increased by a factor of nine in the period from 1985 to 2003 in real terms 3 whereas world trade has only tripled (factor of 2.7). With foreign direct investment accounting for 10.4 percent of total world investment in 2002 (Table 1) larger European economies, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, had a net outflow of foreign direct investment in the period 1991-2003. 5 This also applies to the EU-15 and to the sum of EMU countries. 6 In the same period, the United States also had a net outflow except for 1996-2001.
The flow of technology, often coupled to foreign direct investment or simply taking place within international firms, is a second channel of competition between locations. This also includes organizational knowledge. In contrast to capital, knowledge can be used in a non-rival way and therefore is not necessarily lost once it is passed on to another location, but it may become less valuable for the first location or it may no longer be used at its origin. 
Basic Elements of a Model
Governments can use a set of policy instruments {G, t, In} to attract mobile factors or induce them not to leave the country. They can influence the attractiveness of a location by improving or extending the supply of public goods (G), by choosing tax rates (t) and by putting in place institutional arrangements (In). Related instruments are providing infrastructure in transportation and in education, specifying other aspects of taxation such as defining the tax base and improving soft location factors. A large part of competition among locations takes place in the form of institutional competition in the regulatory framework that determines the way things have to be done in a society (Siebert and Koop, 1993) . These institutional rules can be formal norms, such as constitutional requirements, modes of collective bargaining or the procedures of licensing firms, production processes and products, as well as informal aspects, such as non-codified, habitual behaviour. All these parameters influence the location decisions of firms and residents. (L,K[G,t,In] ). Q can be interpreted as an output vector so that the production function and factor availability define an output space; or in the twocommodity case they define a transformation function. In addition, the economy can enjoy gains from trade Y=T (Q,α) Already in such a small country case, the impact of an exit option of firms becomes apparent. If we take into account not only the mobility of capital but also some of the other channels of interaction, we obtain a much richer and more complex web of interdependencies.
The Impact of Competition between Countries: Losses versus Gains
Let us now look at the losses and the gains from locational competition. The criterion used here to determine whether the inflow or the outflow of mobile factors is beneficial is the welfare level. Welfare refers to the aggregated utility of people or, as a proxy, to national income or income per head. In the policy debate, the GDP growth rate and employment are also often used as a criterion.
The criteria can be applied to the world, an individual country or groups in a country, for instance workers and capital owners.
a. Gains for the world and the capital-importing country
Similarly as trade is a positive-sum game for the world, the mobility of factors of production is a positive-sum game for the world as well. The world will benefit from using capital where its productivity is highest, i.e. from allocating the mobile factor of production more efficiently.
For the capital-importing country, capital imports are beneficial provided that its domestic marginal productivity of capital is higher than the interest rate it has to pay. 14 Otherwise, the country loses and will easily find itself in a foreign-debt trap; then it should not import capital. The import of capital will also have a positive effect on the marginal productivity of labour since workers will be equipped with more capital. This improves the conditions for employment; the real wage can increase.
b. Impact on the capital-exporting country
With respect to the capital-exporting country, however, the answer is more complex. The traditional view is that capital exports are beneficial provided that the interest rate capital receives abroad is higher than its domestic marginal productivity. This means that savers can earn a higher income abroad and that Gross National Income of the capital-exporting country can increase. In this approach, capital exports are interpreted as excess savings that can be used abroad more productively. Thus, in the traditional economic model of capital mobility, the analogy to the trade model applies. Both the capital-importing and the capital-exporting country benefit.
This conclusion no longer holds, if the assumption of the traditional economic model, that capital owners will remain at their original location, is given up. If they leave and take their capital with them, not only is the country's capital 14 For a more cautious statement see Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2005) who find that US FDI tends to increase divergence of lower-income developing countries with respect to the United States.
endowment affected negatively, but also its earning capacity. This argument also applies if entrepreneurs walk off. If residents go away, the emigration country will lose in that its population shrinks. 15 Admittedly, in this interpretation policy targets are associated with a location, for instance GDP or the GDP growth rate; the location has an identity.
There are less drastic scenarios than those where the capital owner emigrates.
Capital can move quite well across borders without residential or entrepreneurial mobility. Let us look at cases in which capital leaves as it has for Germany,
France and the United Kingdom since 1991. Consider, for instance, a situation in which a national government, let us call it the home country, introduces regulations or a tax that reduces the rate of return on capital. Or think of a policy failure in which a government increases uncertainty through its policy means so that the expected rate of return is lowered. An example is that firms in the three continental European countries expect the implicit debt of the social security systems to become explicit eventually, fearing an increase in taxes. Another relevant policy situation is when countries abroad attempt to make themselves more attractive by choosing appropriate policy instruments. This then reduces the relative marginal rate of return of the home country, or for simplicity the relative net marginal productivity of capital from the point of view of firms. In these three cases, the capital stock of the home country will decrease in a comparative-static context. Ceteris paribus, this means a lower GDP. And under the conditions of a growing economy, growth will be lower in the home country.
Thus, in a model of locational competition, the withdrawal of mobile capital can be a phenomenon that represents a loss for a country.
15 Similarly if workers move, the emigration country will lose part of its labour supply and its human capital and, consequently, part of its output. GDP per capita may increase if low-skilled labour leaves; it may fall if highskilled labour emigrates. The migrants, the immigration country and the world as a whole will gain.
This production function approach, however, is not yet the whole story, because there may be gains from trade arising from capital exports which overcompensate the production function loss from capital outflows or which compensate them partly. A more complex analysis therefore has to look at the impact of capital exports on national income via trade or, for simplicity, on the impact of capital exports on the exports of goods and services. We then have to distinguish whether capital exports (K x ) are complements to the exports of goods and services (X), i.e. dX/ dK x > 0, or whether they are substitutes (dX/ dK x < 0).
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If they are complements, exports of goods and services of a country are increased through its capital exports; if they are substitutes, exports of goods and services decline.
c. Capital exports and commodity exports -complements or substitutes?
If capital exports and the export of goods and services are complements to each other, the export of capital may serve to secure the export position of a country. Central and Eastern Europe and China. Growth of the capital-importing country then enhances exports of the capital-exporting industrialized countries and this has a positive effect on the empirically measured elasticity of complementarity.
If, however, capital exports and exports of goods and services are substitutes, the export of capital will be used to build new production facilities abroad which serve the world market. The production of goods migrates to another country, as for instance in a product cycle approach. This reduces the demand for a country's exports. Capital mobility then accelerates a process of structural change that is going on anyhow in older sectors. 17 Nevertheless, there are still benefits through dividend income from exported capital.
d. Will labour lose?
If a country gains in locational competition, this does not mean that all groups of a country will actually benefit. This result is analogous to trade theory. What happens to the economic position of the immobile factors, especially of labour, is at the heart of the locational competition approach. Labour will gain if capital is imported, but it may lose, if capital leaves. Whereas capital exporters earn a higher income abroad, assuming that the marginal productivity in the world lies above the country's marginal productivity, labour in the capital-exporting country is equipped with less capital in a comparative-static framework. Its 
g. First Empirical Results
To empirically determine the relevance of capital exports for the exports of 18 In contrast to this trend, employment in car production increased annually by 3.14 per cent in the period 1995-2002; it seems that employment in the car industry, which has a large portion of its capital stock abroad 19 and in which intra-sector trade dominates, has benefited from off-shoring (Klodt 2004 ). In the food sector, employment also increased in the same period, rising by an annual rate of 0.91 percent; and in recycling it rose by 6.8 per cent, albeit in a sector that has only 19,000 employees. In plastics, employment more or less stagnated. In all other sectors, however, employment 18 The number also includes half-time and mini-jobs. What is telling, is the reduction in employees who (together with their employers) pay contributions to the social security system by 1.6 million to costs by ten percent leads to a one to two percent decline of employment in the parent company (Konings and Murphy, 2001 ). However, for these somewhat older data the substitution is not observed with respect to affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also not found for the service sector. Employment relocation from west to east is not observed (Konings 2004) . Marin (2004) finds that a ten percent decline in affiliate wages in EU accession countries of the first round leads to a 1.6 percent increase in labour demand of the parent company's in Germany and Austria. In spite of these sketchy data, however, a set of policy issues of the European economies such as the dwindling tax base for business taxes in some countries like Germany suggest that locational competition has an impact on economic processes.
Some Implications for Governments and Unions
Governments have to take into account the exit option of capital and of other mobile factors. Meanwhile, even the typical medium-sized firm of the industrial countries tends to have a portfolio of production sites in about a dozen countries.
This means that firms have an option space in which they can optimise their activities. It also means that firms can respond to a government measure by rearranging their production and investment portfolio. This does not only have 20 For somewhat different quantitative results for these sectors for the period 1996-2002 see Klodt (1994) ; according to Klodt, sectors with a lower FDI stock abroad seem to have a more pronounced reduction of jobs.
implications for national GDP, the growth rate, the nature of the business cycle and employment. It also affects tax revenue. Besides the restraint through factor mobility, governments also have to recognize the demonstration effect. Voters will ask to what extent policy approaches used elsewhere can be applied in their own country. competition.
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There are also implications for trade unions in the industrial countries. These implications vary, depending on whether capital exports and the exports of goods and services are complements or substitutes, how high the employment 21 Besides locational competition in the real sphere of the economy, competition between currencies can be viewed as a special form of locational competition. Consider a country expanding its money supply way in excess of the growth of the economy's production potential. Then, the price level rises and purchasing power parity requires the national currency to devalue. Market participants anticipate the devaluation relative to a fixed or crawling peg, and as soon as expectations for depreciation are strong enough, portfolio capital will leave (including capital flow reversals). This then reinforces the process of devaluation. The exchange rate will overshoot. A similar effect of devaluation occurs if the public budget is in disarray and if uncertainty on the repayment of high public debt affects exchange rate expectations negatively. A prominent example is when the governor of Brazil's province of Minhas-Gerais declared that the province's debt would not be repaid. This then triggered the crisis of the Brazilian real in 1999. The interplay of purchasing power parity forming exchange rate expectations and interest rate parity determining portfolio flows can thus lead to an overshooting of the exchange rate, but it can also furnish a check on governments who must aim to prevent such a devaluation giving a negative signal to the voters on the government's performance. This could be observed in 1983, when France was forced to reverse the economic policy it employed during the first two years of the Mitterand presidency, which had aimed at stimulating internal demand. This resulted in high inflation, combined with an increasing current account deficit, rising foreign debt and a devaluation of the French franc. Thus, currency competition can be interpreted as a controlling mechanism for the soundness of monetary and fiscal policy. Multilateral approaches to prevent currency competition have to be viewed with scepticism. Coordination in the form of target zones for exchange rates is unlikely to be an appropriate approach. Target zones not only require a coordinated monetary policy between the central banks. They also necessitate a synchronised fiscal policy in order to prevent different degrees of fiscal frailty arising from diverging debt levels between countries.
Moreover, they would have to call for harmonization of wage policy in those countries where the institutional set-up leaves it up to the social partners to set the wages. Last not least, they would require a consensus on the equilibrium real exchange rate around which the target zones would have to be defined. It is highly unlikely, that all these preconditions will ever be met.
intensity of export production is, and on whether the inter-sector or the intrasector approach to the exchange of goods and services dominates. In the traditional approach with inter-sector trade, the bargaining position of trade unions aiming at a high income for their members and at secure employment is negatively affected by the exit of capital. Assume unions succeed in pushing for a wage increase above productivity growth. In an open economy with capital mobility, capital will then leave the country, and labour productivity will be Opposing views exist on some of some other important implications of the paradigm of locational competition. A first issue is whether locational competition necessarily implies a race to the bottom between countries or whether it can be viewed as a controlling mechanism for governments and as a discovery device. A second question is whether coordination between governments to establish common rules has to be viewed as a governments' cartel or whether common international rules are necessary in an environment of locational competition. Finally, an essential question is whether many national institutional equilibriums can coexist. These are vital policy issues that we will discuss in the following sections.
A Race to the Bottom versus a Discovery Device
Some fear that competition between locations will necessarily lead to a negative downward spiral, or as race to the bottom as some call it (Brecher and Costello 1994) , that may even eventually result in the demise of the nation state. As already discussed, it is indeed true that the exit option of the mobile factors of production introduces a new restraint on the nation state and reduces its room to manoeuvre. Mobile factors can escape national taxation. This means that the nation state will inevitably lose part of its power to tax (Wilson 1987; Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 2003) . In addition, with the exit of each unit of capital the aggregated willingness of firms to pay for the national public good, for instance infrastructure, is reduced. Consequently, the marginal benefit curve of the public good as the vertically aggregated willingness to pay shifts downward and less of the public good becomes optimal in a benefit-cost analysis. In order to prevent the outflow of capital, governments are forced to reduce taxes on capital. They eventually have less and less financial means.
However, there are limits to this process and a lower bound to a race to the bottom is likely to exist. Firms are willing to pay taxes if sufficiently attractive public goods are supplied. Moreover, the state can adjust the financing of its location instruments, for instance by introducing user charges for infrastructure such as roads, ports and airports. Additionally, it is possible to privatise large parts of a previously publicly owned infrastructure in order to set scarcity prices.
Or, the government can switch to benefit taxation, which means that taxes are equivalent to the benefits received by users and not to the ability to pay of firms.
Finally, the nation state can change the structure of its tax system to lean more on indirect taxes, explicit consumption taxes and taxes on immobile factors. The
Scandinavian concept of dual taxation, which places a lower tax rate on the internationally mobile factors of production, i.e. capital income, and a higher tax rate on the income of the immobile factors, i.e. labour income, is already an answer to this problem. 23 All these responses can counteract the spirallingdownward process.
In a similar way, countries do not have to weaken the regulations that protect individuals and the environment, if negative long-run impacts of non-regulation are taken into account by citizens and firms. Moreover, the sector of nontradeables is much less susceptible to locational competition, and it has a dominant weight in many economies, except in the smaller countries with a high degree of openness. For these reasons, it is not true that the nation state fades away (Wade 1996) . 23 Capital income includes profits, dividends, interest income, rents and capital gains. Labour income includes wages, income for management functions, also of entrepreneurs, and pensions. If a higher tax burden is put on the immobile factors, labour may demand a higher pre-tax income; this would worsen the capital outflow and make it more difficult to find an acceptable equilibrium. Putting the tax on consumption prevents this effect.
In contrast to this view of a race to the bottom, competition between locations can be interpreted as a useful mechanism to control the efficiency of governments and as a discovery device for better policy approaches in the sense of Hayek (1968) . Competing for mobile factors puts pressure on countries to find new solutions, for instance by implementing new institutional arrangements or by exploring new technological horizons. It stimulates the imagination and intensifies search effort to find new and better ways of doing things. Moreover, in this view, the technological or institutional solutions employed in the different locations can be explicitly compared. Seeing positive or negative examples from elsewhere may encourage a country to do better than it actually performs. One aspect is that countries can mimic approaches already used successfully abroad. This is why "benchmarking" has become a key concept in the reform programs of several continental states in Europe. Note, however, that the benchmarking strategy does not mean to be at the new institutional frontier.
In addition, locational competition provides a way for people to express their preferences by voting with their feet in the sense of Tiebout (1956) and Hirschman (1970) . In this interpretation, the threat of losing an economic position through locational competition is seen as the price of freedom. Without this threat there would not be the necessary pressure for new solutions.
Furthermore, competition between states, if adhered to, reduces the opportunity of interest groups to rent-seek and thus raises efficiency.
To some extent, and in extreme cases, competition between locations may even be seen as an instrument to tame the Hobbesian Leviathan. This happens when people vote with their feet, as when some 600 East Germans stormed the Hungarian border at Sopran on 19 August 1989, and Hungary did nothing to prevent them. In such cases, systems can collapse as communism did. In this respect, the exit option controls governments. Thus, competition among locations can indeed be seen not only as an economic, but also as an important political mechanism.
Rules for Locational Competition: A Cartel of Governments versus Reducing Transaction Costs
Different views also exist on whether a common set of rules is necessary in an environment of locational competition. If the competitive process between countries is seen as a race to the bottom, institutional harmonization will be called for. As a counter position, to strive for intergovernmental cooperation and institutional harmonization can be viewed as a natural reaction of governments.
They form a cartel of institutional rules, restraining the mobility of factors of production and of residents, in order to reduce the pressure which locational competition exercises on governments.
We will here argue that in locational competition a set of rules are necessary in order to keep transaction costs low, the most important reason being to prevent strategic and opportunistic behaviour of countries that distort the competitive process to the detriment of other countries. It is important to clearly delineate the cases in which these rules are needed. The following cases have to be distinguished:
i) Global public goods cannot be allocated by competitive processes. For instance, in global warming because of greenhouse gases and in damage to the ozone layer the concept of competition between countries cannot be used to determine the optimal quantity or quality of the environmental media at stake.
Once the target value has been agreed upon and property right have been assigned, markets can come in to find the least-cost solutions for the abatement of pollutants. Terrorism is a threat to security, and security is a public good with global properties. By definition, global goods do not involve costs of reducing competition, and there are gains from cooperation. In these cases, international cooperation and common rules are needed. Free-rider behaviour of countries is to be discouraged.
In a strict interpretation, public goods are "consumed in equal amounts by all" (Samuelson 1954) . To justify common rules between countries, the public good must be global. If public goods only have a national dimension, they do not satisfy the property of a global public good and therefore fit the criteria for competition between countries. From a global perspective, such goods are like club goods with nations representing the club.
ii) Border-crossing externalities, both negative and positive, distort the market allocation and the competitive process. Cross-border environmental pollution is an example of a negative externality. There are gains to be made by cooperation in order to internalise these externalities.
However, not every interdependence between countries is a real externality. We must distinguish between market externalities and non-market externalities. A market externality means that an interdependence between countries exists through the market mechanism, in our context especially the factor markets. A non-market externality or a "technological" externality means that the interdependence goes through other, non-market systems, so to say through technological systems, for instance meteorological systems in the case of global warming or social (including religious) systems in the case of terrorism. for the mobile factors of production.
A Single World Equilibrium versus Many National Equilibriums
A fascinating, but open question is whether competition between locations will eventually lead to a single equilibrium in the world economy or whether many different national or regional equilibriums are feasible. The argument in favour of many different equilibriums in face of the mobility of factors and residents is that conditions in the regions of the world are markedly different and that historical experience suggests that different institutional solutions can coexist as they do, for example, in the case of varying fiscal regimes at the state level in the US. Another important aspect is that people's preferences differ, and this means that people attempt to find different solutions. However, with factor mobility the economic position of a country can erode if it loses mobile factors due to internal false incentives and the inability to adjust to new external conditions. Apparently, a condition for many national equilibriums to exist is that they must be sustainable in the long-run. Locations must be able to hold on to factors of production and to inhabitants. If factors and people exit, this process must at least come to a halt at some level that is sustainable. Otherwise many national equilibriums will not be possible.
Even if adjustment processes in locational competition take a long time, the pressure of competition between locations is a powerful economic force when all the channels of interaction are taken into consideration. Thus, nearly all Latin Germany's great pains to repair its stalling economic engine (Siebert 2005) . All these examples and the issues discussed in this paper demonstrate that -contrary to Krugman's evaluation -competition between locations is a powerful economic paradigm.
Conclusions
Locational competition is an important concept to explain the international division of labour in an environment where factors have become more mobile internationally and where nations compete for the mobile factors of productionfor capital, technology and high-skilled labour. Countries can improve their welfare if they succeed in holding on to their own mobile factors at home or in attracting new ones from abroad. This widely neglected or even ignored approach is in sharp contrast to trade theory where factor endowments are treated as given and where differences in endowment are exploited. To summarize, our main points are:
• The world and the capital-importing country will gain from locational competition.
• For the capital-exporting country, the answer is more complex. It loses capital and its labour productivity will be reduced. This may be compensated by an increase in exports and gains from trade, depending on whether capital exports and the exports of goods and services are complements or substitutes.
• Employment effects in the capital-exporting countries are a function of the employment intensity of exports and on the relationship of capital exports and the exports of goods and services, i.e. their complementarity or substitutability.
Potential negative implications on exports and employment are less pronounced in a world of intra-sector trade instead of inter-sector trade.
• The exit option of capital introduces a new constraint into the calculus of governments and trade unions.
• Locational competition will not necessarily result in a race to the bottom because governments have policy instruments at their disposal to adjust to the increased mobility of factors. If, however, countries do not respond appropriately, an erosion of their economic position can ensue.
• Locational competition can be a controlling mechanism to curb the inefficiency of governments and it can work as a discovery device to produce new and better institutional solutions.
• Coordination by means of a common rule system for competition between countries is necessary when the allocation of global public goods is at stake and when border-crossing externalities cause disruptions of the competitive process that are so large that their internalisation creates more benefits than it causes coordination costs. In other cases, international coordination may represent a 33 cartel of governments to reduce competitive pressure. This would then reduce welfare.
• A rule system is also justified in order to prevent strategic behaviour of individual countries and distortions that would cause high transaction costs.
Agreement is needed on a frame of reference from which to define and identify the distortions. A promising approach to define such a frame of reference is to accept that differences in the factor endowment of countries with immobile factors exist and that countries have different preferences for public and merit goods. It would also be helpful to accept the results of competition for the mobile factors of production in the international factor markets.
• It can be expected that an international order for locational competition evolves slowly over time in a Hayekian process.
